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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Nelson Farmer appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon his guilty plea to aggravated assault, and from the district court's order
denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April 2014, officers were called to a Post Falls residence on the report of
a physical domestic dispute.

(PSI, pp.3-4.)

There, officers observed Doris

Williams standing across the street from the residence with physical injuries to
her head, and with blood running down her face.

(Id.)

Officers then made

contact with Williams' brother, Thomas Farmer, who was standing on the porch of
the residence. (Id.) Farmer had blood on his hands and on his clothing. (Id.)
Officers spoke with Williams' and Farmer's mother, who was also at the
residence.

(Id.)

Farmer had been drinking for the last couple of days, and

physically attacked Williams when Williams told him that he could no longer live
at the residence if he continued to drink.

(Id.) Thomas pulled Williams' hair,

pushed her down onto a bike, and pressed his forearm across her throat while
stating, "I'll kill you Bitch." (Id.) Farmer's mother pulled Farmer's hair and hit him
with a frying pan to get him off of Williams. (Id.) Williams reported to officers that
she could not breathe while Farmer was pressing his forearm against her neck,
and that she thought she was going to die. (Id.)
Officers arrested Farmer and noted the strong odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from Farmer's breath. (Id.) After receiving Miranda warnings,
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Farmer acknowledged to the officer that he "grabbed" his sister, but stated that
she "deserved it." (Id.) After the arrest, Williams told the officers that she did not
want Farmer to return to the residence because she was afraid Farmer would kill
her. (Id.)
The state charged Farmer with aggravated assault and the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.37-38.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Farmer entered an Alford 1 plea to aggravated assault, and the state agreed to
dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (R., p.61; 3/25/14 Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.16,
L.5.)

The agreement did not bind the sentencing recommendations of either

party. (R., p.61; 3/25/14 Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.12.)
Prior to sentencing, but after the PSI, LSI-R assessment, and GAIN-I
evaluation were completed, Farmer moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the
ground that he was incorrectly informed of the terms of the plea agreement by his
defense counsel. (5/12/14 Tr., p.35, L.19 - p.38, L.14; 5/16/14 Tr., p.42, L.2 p.44, L.10.) After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.77-78;
see generally, 5/16/14 Tr.)

The district court imposed a unified five-year

sentence with two years fixed.

(R., pp.74-76.)

The court denied Farmer's

subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.89-92; 10/14/14
district court order; 2 see generally 10/6/14 Tr.)

Farmer timely appealed.

(R.,

pp.79-82.)

1

Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

2

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Farmer's motion to augment the record with
the district court's order denying Farmer's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
sentence. (3/18/15 Order.)
2

ISSUES
Farmer states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Farmer's Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
upon Mr. Farmer a sentence of five years, with two years
fixed, following his plea of guilty to aggravated assault?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Farmer's Rule 35 Motion for leniency?

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Farmer failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Has Farmer failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

3.

Has Farmer failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his I.C.R. 35 motion?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
Farmer Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Farmer contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault. (Appellant's brief, pp.612.)

Farmer's contention fails because a review of the record reveals that

Farmer failed to establish either that his plea was constitutionally invalid, or that
there was any other just reason for the withdrawal of his plea.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358,362,941
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v.
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125
Idaho 254, 256, 869 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion By Denying Farmer's
I.C.R. 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is

imposed.

I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an

automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281,
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284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears
the burden of proving,

the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn.

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,
37 4-375, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992).
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State
v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). As a
matter of constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is
"entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must
determine whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the
plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. The good faith, credibility,
and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his
plea are matters for the trial court to decide. 1.9.:. at 537, 211 P.3d at 782.
When the I.C.R. 35 motion is presented after the defendant has learned of
the content of the PSI or has received other information about the probable
sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's
apparent motive. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App.
2004).
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In this case, Farmer asserted that his guilty plea was not knowing or
voluntary because, he asserted, his defense counsel informed him that the state
would recommend that the court place Farmer on probation. (5/12/14 Tr., p.35,
L. 19 - p.38, L.14; 5/16/14 Tr., p.42, L.2 - p.44, L.10.)

Farmer's counsel

represented to the court that she "advised [Farmer] that the state was going to be
recommending probation," but did not provide any details regarding the timing of
this advisement in relation to the change of plea hearing.
Ls.13-21.)

(5/16/14 Tr., p.42,

Farmer's counsel also submitted to the court an email exchange

between her and the prosecutor in which defense counsel expressed some
confusion about the terms of the plea agreement. (5/12/14 Tr., p.42, L.22 - p.43,
L.11.)

This email was not admitted into evidence and is not a part of the

appellate record. (See id.)
The district court cited the applicable legal standard, denied the motion,
and concluded that "the issue of the state's recommendation was clear to
[Farmer]."

(R., pp.74-76; 5/16/14 Tr., p.47, L.14 - p.48, L.22.)

The court

generated a "rough transcript" of the change of plea hearing through its court
reporter and noted that Farmer was specifically informed of the terms of the plea
agreement, including that the state would be entitled to recommend any
sentence up to the maximum sentence for aggravated assault.

(5/16/14 Tr.,

p.41, Ls.12-18; p.48, L.16 - p.49, L.18.) The court also referenced a comment
made by defense counsel in a prior argument for Farmer's release on his own
recognizance

that

indicated

that

Farmer

was

aware

that

recommendations would be open. (5/16/14 Tr., p.49, L.19 - p.50, L.1.)

6

sentencing

A review of the record supports the district court's determination. At the
change of plea hearing, the court specifically informed Farmer that "[t]he parties
for either side have open recommendations up to the statutory maximums or
minimum recommendations as you may choose." (3/25/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25.)
Farmer indicated that he understood the agreement and that he had had enough
time to discuss the agreement with his counsel.

(3/25/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-24.)

Later in the hearing, the court informed Farmer even more specifically that the
state could "recommend anything it wants to up to five years in prison." (3/25/14
Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.2.) Farmer indicated that he was aware of this term of the
plea agreement. (3/25/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-4.) Farmer also indicated to the court
that other than the plea agreement that was discussed in open court, nobody
promised him anything in order to compel his guilty plea. (3/25/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.25.)

Further, the "sentence recommendation" entry on the state's pretrial

settlement offer form signed by Farmer stated "Open Recs[.]" (R., p.61.) Neither
the change of plea transcript nor the pretrial settlement offer form contain any
confusing or contradictory information with regard to this term of the plea
agreement. (See R., p.61; see generally 3/25/14 Tr.)
Additionally, at the conclusion of the change of plea hearing, in the course
of Farmer's counsel's argument for Farmer's release on his own recognizance,
counsel stated that "it's important to note this plea agreement is open and my
client understands that his performance on an O.R. release would be a very
strong piece of evidence that your Honor would consider at the time of

7

sentencing." (3/25/14 Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.) This indicates that Farmer was
aware that the state was not bound to recommend any particular sentence.
Farmer moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the date of the scheduled
sentencing hearing, after the PSI, LSI-R assessment, and GAIN-I evaluation had
been completed and distributed to the court and to the parties. (5/12/14 Tr., p.23,
L.10 - p.36, L.22.) The presentence investigator recommended that Farmer be
sentenced to a prison term, and the LSI-R assessment concluded that Farmer
was a "high risk" to re-offend.

(PSI, p.32; LSI-R assessment, p.1.)

Because

Farmer was aware of this information prior to his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, the district court was entitled to "temper its liberality by weighing the
defendant's apparent motive." Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583. At the
hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the district court indicated that
it was aware of its discretion to do so. (5/16/14 Tr., p.48, Ls.6-15.)
Finally, there was a lack of specific evidence in the record regarding what
exactly defense counsel told Farmer about the nature of the terms of the plea
agreement. While defense counsel represented to the court that she "might well
have told" Farmer that the state's sentencing recommendation would be for
probation (5/12/14 Tr., p.36, Ls.5-7), and later that she "advised [Farmer] that the
state was going to be recommending probation," (5/16/14 Tr., p.42, L.13-21), it is
unclear whether she was expressing her own memory of events or was relying
on allegations made to her by Farmer.

Further, it is unclear from these

statements whether Farmer alleged that defense counsel specifically told him
that the state would be bound by the plea agreement to recommend probation, or

8 .

whether this was simply defense counsel's expectation regarding the state's
recommendation that she expressed to Farmer.

Finally, as the district court

concluded, even "notwithstanding the fact that [Farmer's] counsel may have
given [Farmer) some erroneous information before the plea, at the time of the
plea [Farmer] knew that the state could recommend up to five years in prison
without a probation recommendation." (5/16/14 Tr., p.50, Ls.2-8.) As discussed
above, this conclusion is supported by the record.
Farmer has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault.
This Court must therefore affirm Farmer's conviction.

11.
Farmer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Farmer contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

an excessive sentence.

(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14).

Farmer has failed to

establish that the district court's five-year unified sentence with two years fixed is
excessive considering the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the crime, and
Farmer's extensive criminal record.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
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397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

kt

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is
excessive.

kt

To establish that the sentence is excessive, Farmer must

demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution.

kt

In this case, prior to imposing its sentence, the district court reviewed the
PSI, the LSI-R assessment, and the GAIN-I evaluation. (5/12/14 Tr., p.33, L.15 p.34, L.17.)

The district court also specifically referenced the appropriate

sentencing factors. (5/16/14 Tr., p. 70, L.17 - p. 71, L.1.) A review of the nature of
Farmer's crime, his extensive criminal history, and a review of the relevant
sentencing materials supports the district court's sentencing determination.
The violent nature of Farmer's crime warrants the sentence imposed.
Both Farmer's sister and mother reported to officers that they believed Farmer
was going to kill his sister when he pressed his forearm against her neck. (PSI,
pp.3-4.)

Farmer's sister reported that she was not able to breath during this

attack, and Farmer's mother reported that she had to strike Farmer with a frying
pan in order to get Farmer off of his sister. (Id.) The attack resulted in blood
being splattered on both Farmer and his sister.
intoxicated at the time.

(Id.)

(Id.)

Farmer was heavily

The nature of Farmer's attack on his sister
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demonstrates that Farmer presents a significant risk to his family or the
community-at-large when he is under the influence.
Farmer has an extensive criminal history. The PSI lists over 40 various
criminal charges, and convictions for battery, assault, battery on a police officer
or emergency personnel, taking a vehicle without the owner's consent, and
possession of a controlled substance, among other charges. (PSI, pp.5-14.) The
PSI also lists numerous probation and parole violations. (Id.) Farmer reported to
the presentence investigator that he had spent a cumulative twelve years in
prison. (PSI, p.14.)
Finally,

Farmer has demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the

significance of his criminal conduct.

Farmer told the presentence investigator

that his sister was "trying to look like the victim." (PSI, p.5.) The presentence
investigator observed that Farmer "appeared to minimize and justify his past
criminal history and drug abuse." (PSI, p.22.) Based upon "the level of assessed
risk and need and other protective factors," the presentence investigator
recommended that the district court impose a sentence of prison incarceration.
(PSI, p.23.)
The district court's unified five-year sentence with two years fixed for
aggravated assault was entirely reasonable in light of the objectives of
sentencing, the nature of the crime, and Farmer's extensive criminal history.
Farmer has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.
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111.
Farmer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His I.C.R. 35 Motion
Introduction

A.

Farmer asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.)

However, a review of the record reveals that the district court's original sentence
was not excessive, even in light of the additional information presented by
Farmer in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of
the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159
P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

To prevail on appeal, Farmer must "show that the

sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

C.

lit

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying
Farmer's I.C.R. 35 Motion
Farmer filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence approximately

three months after his judgment of conviction was entered. (R., pp.89-92.) In
support of the motion, Farmer submitted a letter in which he alleged: (1) his sister
did

not

need

medical

attention

after the

aggravated

assault;

(2)

he

misunderstood the terms of the plea agreement; (3) he was currently on a waiting
list to take an anger management course; (4) a defendant in a similar case had
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received a lesser sentence; and (5) the Idaho state prison system has an
"excellent pre-release program" that would
employment when he was released.

(Id.)

help him find

housing and

At the subsequent hearing on the

motion, Farmer clarified that he was requesting the court to reduce the fixed
portion of his sentence so he could either be eligible for parole immediately, or so
that he could have an earlier release date and thus be eligible for treatment
immediately. (10/6/14 Tr., p.7, L.8- p.8, L.8.)
The district court cited the applicable standard and denied Farmer's I.C.R.
35 motion. (10/14/14 district court order; 10/6/14 Tr., p.12, L.6- p.13, L.11.) This
determination is supported by a review of the record.

First, much of the

information presented by Farmer in support of his motion was already before the
court at the time of sentencing (e.g., the fact that his sister did not need medical
attention after the aggravated assault, his assertion that he misunderstood the
terms of the plea agreement, the general nature of the Idaho Department of
Correction "pre-release program.")

The only "new" information provided by

Farmer was that he was on a waiting list for treatment, and that he was currently
attending church services. (See R., pp.89-92; see generally 10/6/14 Tr.) This
information did not render the district court's original sentence excessive.
Further, by the time Farmer filed his I.C.R. 35 motion, he had only
approximately 17 months to serve on his two-year fixed sentence.
pp.89-92; 5/16/14 Tr., p.72, Ls.19-20.)

(See R.,

An appellate court reviews the whole

sentence on appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
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726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion by
requiring Farmer to serve the remaining of his fixed term in the light of the
circumstances of this case.
The district court acted well within its sentencing discretion in denying
Farmer's I.C.R. 35 motion. This Court must therefore affirm the district court's
order.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
conviction imposed upon Farmer's guilty plea to aggravated assault, and the
district court's order denying Farmer's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015.

MARK W. OLSON
'
Deputy Attorney General
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